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SPALLONE V. UNITED STATES: SIMPLY A CASE OF AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION?
IN SPALLONE V. UNITED STATES,' the Supreme Court of
the United States held that it was an abuse of discretion for the
district court to hold four Yonkers city councilmembers in con-
tempt for refusing to vote in favor of legislation implementing a
consent decree earlier approved by the city. The legislation would
have remedied the intentional racial housing segregation that the
city had engaged in over a period of many years.2
The Court announced that its decision was based solely on
traditional equitable principles and specifically declined to address
two of the defenses raised by the defendant councilmembers. 3 The
first defense raised by the councilmembers was that the district
court's imposition of contempt sanctions violated their free speech
rights under the first amendment. Their second defense was that
the contempt sanctions violated the federal common law doctrine
of legislative immunity.4
In spite of the Court's declaration that this was simply a case
of an abuse of discretion by the district court, the opinion was
clearly influenced by deference to the principles behind the federal
common law doctrine of legislative immunity. As such, this case is
worthy of comment.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1980, the United States filed a complaint against the city
of Yonkers and the Yonkers Community Development Agency
(YCDA) alleging that the two defendants had engaged in housing
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968 and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.5 The United States claimed that the city had equated subsi-
dized housing with minority housing, and therefore restricted sub-
sidized housing projects to areas of the city already predominantly
1. 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990).
2. Id. at 628.
3. Id. at 631.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 628.
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populated by minorities.6 In 1985, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York found the city and
the YCDA liable, concluding that the city had engaged in actions
both "consistent and extreme" in an effort to preserve existing
patterns of segregation, in the city.'
The district court entered a remedial order in 1986 that en-
joined the city and its development agency, their officers, agents,
employees, and others acting in concert with them, from intention-
ally promoting racial segregation in Yonkers and required the city
to take extensive affirmative steps to disperse public housing
'throughout the city of Yonkers. 8
While the appeal of the liability and remedial orders was
pending, the city failed to comply with the remedial order. The
United States moved for an adjudication of civil contempt and the
imposition of coercive sanctions, but the district court refused to
take such action.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the first judgment of the district court in all respects'0
and the Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari."
Shortly after the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the district court, the parties agreed to a consent decree that set
forth certain actions the city 'would take to implement the reme-
dial order. These actions included the adoption, within 90 days, of
legislation which conditioned the construction of multifamily
housing on the inclusion of at least 20 percent assisted units,
granting tax abatements and density bonuses to developers, and
providing for zoning changes.' 2 The consent decree was approved
by the city council in a five-to-two vote (Councilmembers Spallone
and Chema voting no) and entered by the district court shortly
thereafter.' 3
The city, however, continued to delay implementing the legis-
lation required under the consent decree. This prompted the dis-
trict court to enter an order requiring the city to enact the legisla-
6. Id.
7. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1369 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
8. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
9. Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 629 (1990).
10. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987).
11. 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
12. Spailone, 110 S. Ct. at 629.
13. Id.
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tion and providing that the failure to do so would result in
contempt citations, escalating daily fines for the city, and daily
fines and imprisonment for councilmembers who remained in
contempt. 4
In spite of the district court's threatened sanctions, the city
council defeated a resolution of intent to adopt the required legis-
lative package by a vote of four to three. 5 The district court then
held the city in contempt and imposed sanctions on it. After ques-
tioning the individual councilmembers as to their failure to adopt
the required legislation, the court held each of the four
councilmembers voting no on the package in contempt and
imposed sanctions.' 6  The court refused to accept the
councilmembers' arguments that the city of Yonkers alone was
the proper subject of contempt sanction and overruled their objec-
tion that the court lacked the power to direct the councilmembers
how to vote. The court ruled that in light of the earlier consent
decree, the city's adoption of the required legislation would be "in
the nature of a ministerial act."'17
The court of appeals affirmed the adjudications of contempt
and sanctions against both the city and-the councilmembers, re-
jecting the argument that the district court had abused its discre-
tion in selecting the method of enforcing the consent judgment.'"
The court of appeals also rejected the defendants' invocation of
the federal common law doctrine of legislative immunity and first
amendment protection.'
Both the city and the councilmembers requested the Supreme
Court to stay the imposition of sanctions pending filing and dispo-
sition of petitions for certiorari. The Court granted a stay for the-
councilmembers but denied the city's request.2 0 When the city's
daily contempt sanctions approached one million dollars per day,-
the city council enacted the required legislation by a vote of five to
two (Councilmembers Spallone and Fagan voting no)." The Su-
preme Court, recognizing that the contempt citations on the
councilmembers raised important issues about the appropriate ex-
14. Id. at 630.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 455-57 (2d Cir. 1988).
20. Spallone, I10 S. Ct. at 631.
21. Id. at 631.
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ercise of federal judicial power, granted certiorari.22
II. SPALLONE V. UNITED STATES
A. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, author of the majority opinion,
framed the issue as whether "it was a proper exercise of judicial
power for the district court to hold petitioners, four Yonkers city
councilmembers, in contempt for refusing to vote in favor of legis-
lation implementing a consent decree earlier approved by the
city."23 The Court noted that there was no question as to the lia-
bility of the city of Yonkers for racial discrimination or to the
appropriateness of the district court's remedial order - it was
within the bounds of the court's discretion. 4
The councilmembers argued that the district court's contempt
sanctions violated their rights of freedom of speech under the first
amendment, and further, "that they [were] entitled, as legislators,
to absolute immunity for actions taken in discharge of their legis-
lative responsibilities."2 5 The Court did not address these issues
because it concluded that the district court's order imposing con-
tempt sanctions against the councilmembers if they failed to vote
in favor of the court ordered legislation was an abuse of the trial
court's discretion under traditional equitable principles.26
The Court noted that the district court was entitled to rely on
the axiom that "courts have inherent power to enforce compliance
with their lawful orders through civil contempt."2 7 Further,
"[w]hen the district court's order is necessary to remedy past dis-
crimination, the court has an additional basis for the exercise of
broad equitable powers."28 However, the Court noted that a trial
court's equitable remedial powers are not unbounded. The Court
emphasized that a district court must be sensitive to the interest
which state and local authorities have in handling their duties.2"
The Court also observed that "the use of the contempt power
places an additional limitation on a district court's discretion, for
22. Spallone v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989).
23. Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 628 (1990).
24. Id. at 631.
25. id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 632 (quoting Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966)).
28. Id. at 632.
29. Id. (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977)).
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"in selecting contempt sanctions, a court is obliged to use the
'least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' -o
In evaluating the present case in light of these principles, the
Court recognized as important the fact that the councilmembers
were not parties to the original action against the city and were
not found "liable for any of the violations upon which the reme-
dial decree was based." 3' 1 The city, in fact, capitulated under its
contempt sanctions even while the contempt sanctions against the
councilmembers were stayed.2 Thus, the Court reasoned that the
district court could have achieved its desired goal of forcing the
city to implement the mandated legislative package without im-
posing contempt sanctions on the individual councilmembers. The
district court should have considered sanctions on the
councilmembers, according to the Court, only if after a reasonable
time the sanctions against the city alone had failed to accomplish
the necessary result.3
Chief Justice Rehnquist also contemplated the federal com-
mon law of legislative immunity. The Court previously had held
that the legislative acts of state and regional legislators were abso-
lutely privileged.3 4 However, the Court determined that these ear-
lier cases did not "control the question whether local legislators
[were] immune from contempt sanctions imposed for failure to
vote in favor of a particular legislative bill."135 Nonetheless, the
Court noted that the considerations behind the legislative immu-
nity doctrine should have been considered by the district court in
its exercise of discretion in the present case. 6
According to the Court, the imposition of contempt sanctions
on individual legislators is designed to cause them to vote, not
with their constituents' interests in mind, but rather with their
own personal interests in mind.3 7 Such contempt sanctions en-
courage legislators to declare that they favor particular legislation
not to avoid bankrupting the city, but instead to avoid bankrupt-
30. Id. (quoting United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 454 (2d Cir. 1988)
(quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 18 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 61, 69 (1821)).
31. Id. at 632-33.
32. Id. at 633.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440
U.S. 391, 404-05 (1979)).
35. Id. at 633-64.
36. Id. at 634.
37. Id.
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ing themselves, resulting in a "perversion of the normal legislative
process."8" On the other hand, where the legislators are voting in
favor of legislation to avoid bankrupting the city alone, they are,
suggested the Court, engaged in a "calculus" with which they are
well-familiar. 9
The Court, therefore, concluded that in view of the "ex-
traordinary" nature of the contempt sanctions imposed against the
councilmembers, the district court should have first imposed con-
tempt sanctions on the city alone before even considering imposing
contempt sanctions against the councilmembers.4 ° This squares,
the Court said, with "the doctrine that a court must exercise 'the
least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' 41
B. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Brennan, with
whom Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined.4" Justice
Brennan began by noting that the district court judge who had
imposed the contempt sanctions on the councilmembers had "inti-
mate contact" with the councilmembers for many years and pos-
sessed "special insight" into the best way to coerce compliance
with the court's remedial order when all cooperative efforts had
failed.43 He suggested that the majority's opinion was an "ex post
rationalization" of the case and did a great injustice to both the
facts of the case and the art of judging."
The dissent noted that the majority's opinion rested on two
misguided premises: (1) the district court should have known that
there was a reasonable probability that contempt sanctions against
the city alone would have produced the desired results; and (2)
imposing personal contempt fines on the councilmembers effected
a greater perversion of the legislative decison-making process than
contempt sanctions on the city alone.45
Justice Brennan attacked the first premise by noting that the
Court erred in "according no weight" to the district court's
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 371 (citations omitted)).
42. Id. at 635-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 635 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 640 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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"vastly superior vantage point."" 6 Further, the Court turned a
"blind eye" to the evidence available that supported the district
court's assessment that sanctions were necessary on both the city
and the councilmembers. 47 To emphasize the last point, Justice
Brennan extensively recited the history of the case.48 Finally, he
argued that the Court failed to acknowledge that the imposition of
contempt sanctions on both the city and the councilmembers could
more promptly secure a compliance with the court's order.4 9 Jus-
tice Brennan concluded his attack on the majority's first premise
by stating that the "Court's determination to play district court-
for-a-day - and to do so poorly - is. indefensible. 50
Justice Brennan then t6ok aim at the majority's second pre-
mise. He noted that while the Court refused to hold that the doc-
trine of absolute legislative immunity was applicable to local legis-
lators, it did rule that the principles underlying the doctrine,
namely legislative independence, must "inform" the district court
in its exercise of discretion in imposing contempt sanctions. 51 This
position presumed "that a district court, while seeking to coerce
compliance with a consent decree promising to implement a spe-
cific remedy for a constitutional violation, must take . . . care to
preserve the 'normal legislative process.' "52 Justice Brennan
pointed out that this was inconsistent with the Court's approach to
the executive decision-making process, which is analogous to the
legislative decision-making process. In the executive decision-mak-
ing process, the Court "has never evinced an overriding concern
for replicating the 'normal' decisionmaking process when design-
ing coercive sanctions for state and local executive officials." 53
Why, then, he asked, should the Court do so for legislators at the
local level?
Justice Brennan labeled as misguided the majority's claim
that the imposition of sanctions on the councilmembers perverted
the normal legislative decision-making process. He argued the "re-
sult of the councilmembers' 'calculus' is preordained, and the only
relevant question is how the court can best encourage - or if nec-
46. Id. at 641 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 643 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 644 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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essary coerce - compliance."54
Finally, he argued that "once a federal court has issued a
valid order to remedy the effects of a prior, specific constitutional
violation, the representatives are no longer 'acting in a field where
legislators traditionally have power to act.' "I' Indeed, it seemed
clear that the wish of a legislative body cannot take precedence
over an order to conform to the Constitution.5"
Thus, Justice Brennan concluded, the Court's decision in-
voked "no principle of any sort" and sent a message to district
courts that "even the most delicate remedial choices by the most
conscientious and deliberate judges are subject to being second-
guessed by" the Court.57 Such a result, he ruled, can only "em-
bold[en] recalcitrant officials [to] continually . . . test the ulti-
mate reach of the remedial authority of the federal courts."58
I1. ANALYSIS
The majority's opinion was both well-written and persuasive.
Its choice to narrowly focus only on the issue of whether there was
an abuse of discretion was appropriate because this issue was suf-
ficient to resolve the present case. While it is disappointing that
the majority did not address the tantalizing first amendment and
legislative immunity claims raised by the councilmembers, it is
understandable given that the case could be and was decided on
non-constitutional grounds. One can only hope, however, that none
who read the opinion are lead to believe that legislative immunity
has been held not to extend to local legislators.
The majority's thorough recitation of the principles that
guided its evaluation of the district court's exercise of discretion
signaled reliance on well-developed principles in spite of the dis-
sent's claims to the contrary. The majority's use of the principles
underlying the federal common law doctrine of legislative immu-
nity to "inform" the court of the appropriateness of contempt
sanctions on local legislators was somewhat disingenuous. In fact,
an honest assessment of the opinion suggests that the Court's use
of these principles was dispositive of the case. It is on these
54. Id. at 646 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 645 (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951)) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)
57. Id. at 648 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1154 [Vol. 40:1147
SPALLONE v. UNITED STATES
grounds that the majority's opinion is open to criticism. The opin-
ion should have more clearly articulated the weight that was given
to legislative immunity considerations. If it had done so, the ma-
jority would be less open to the dissent's burning criticisms.
The dissent's observation that the majority seemed to be sec-
ond-guessing the district court judge was persuasive on its face.
However, when considering the appropriate role of the reviewing
court, all reviewing courts who overturn a lower court are open to
the same charge from those who agree - for whatever reason -
with the lower court's decision.
The majority also failed to respond to the dissent's argument
that the perversion of the normal legislative decison-making pro-
cess caused by contempt sanctions on legislators was no greater
than the perversion of the executive decision-making process
caused by sanctions on members of the executive branch, a clearly
analogous situation in which the Court has had no such compunc-
tions. Additionally, the majority was oddly silent on the claim that
the councilmembers' actions being sanctioned were not "legisla-
tive" in nature and, therefore, the sanctions were not impinging on
legislative powers and immunities.
The dissent's harsh words for the majority and its attempt to
persuade by shear volume of opinion undercut the effectiveness of
its opinion. The dissent would have been wiser to address the prin-
ciples underlying the doctrine of legislative immunity rather than
hurling insults at the majority. The dissent, as noted earlier, effec-
tively demonstrated the inconsistency in the majority's argument
that contempt sanctions on the councilmembers were a "perver-
sion" of the normal legislative decision-making process. Justice
Brennan though, failed to press the attack and explain why the
principles of legislative independence, among the others that the
majority relied on, should not have been used to overturn the
lower court's contempt sanctions.
Further, the dissent's argument seemed to be that under no
circumstances whatsoever should a lower court be overturned for
an abuse of discretion. It almost seemed as if the dissent was ar-
guing not only for substantial deference, but for absolute defer-
ence to the lower court. In this respect, the dissent should have
articulated some guiding principles to more clearly demonstrate
the circumstances in which a court abuses its discretion and why
the present case was not such an abuse.
The dissent's assertion that a valid court order remedying
past constitutional violations should be subject to no counter-
11551989-90]
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vailing concerns is wide of the mark. Clearly the dissent was not
suggesting that the courts can exercise unlimited power, especially
when a lesser exercise of power would be sufficient. What, then,
was it arguing for? Perhaps the dissent should have more care-
fully read the majority's opinion, paying particular attention to
the principles recited governing a court's equitable powers. If it
had done so, it would have realized that the argument it was mak-
ing was untenable and contrary to well-established principles.
Finally the dissent's claim that it was appropriate to impose
contempt sanctions on the councilmembers to encourage prompt
compliance with its order is interesting but unpersuasive in light
of the majority's conclusion that the district court needed only at-
tempt lesser sanctions first only for a reasonable amount of time.
To accept the dissent's viewloint is to believe that a reasonable
amount of time is no time at all.
IV. CONCLUSION
Though the majority's opinion was not without flaws, it was
the more persuasive of the two opinions and reached the proper
result for the case. The dissent's opinion, though it possessed a few
valuable insights and identified weaknesses in the majority opin-
ion, seemed to be predicated on the belief that absolute deference
should be paid to lower courts, that lower courts may use unlim-
ited powers in remedying constitutional violations, and that any
review for abuse of discretion was inappropriate. Such an opinion
is both frightening in its implications and inconsistent with a na-
tion governed by law. Finally, it cannot be emphasized enough
.that the issue of legislative immunity was not at issue in this case
and may still be available for argument given the right circum-
stances.
DONALD S. YARAB
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